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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

MATTHEW PAGANO, C A R M A N
PAGANO and MILLEO PAGANO,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case No.
13864

MARY P. WALKER,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action in equity brought by respondents
against appelant, their sister, to require appelant to
divide funds, obtained thirough joint tenancy accounts
with their mother, under circumstances where appellant
has adknowledged that she was directed by her mother
to divide this money with her brothers.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial count, aaffeer trial with an advisory jury, fenpressed a constructive trust on the funds and rendered
judgment requiring appellant to divide the funds with
respondents.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmation on the judgment of
the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's statement of feet is correct as to the
portions presented, but there are many important omissions regarding events both prior and subsequent to the
death of Lucy Plagano, that form a basis for the court's
equity decision.
Luke Pagano and Lucy Pagano had five children,
the parties of this action,, and a son Charles, who died in
1947. This couple, with the help of their two oldest sons,
Matthew and Carman (TR 83,129), operated small truck
garden farms both within and outside the city limits of
Ogden during their entire adult life (TR 24, 25, 82, 129).
They were extremely frugal and invested their earnings
in land, mortgages and escrows (TR 29, 231). Both Luke
and Lucy Pagano were born in Italy, and although they
were intelligent people, they had very little formal education (TR 27). Luke P&gano died in Ogden, January
5, 1965, and at the time of his death the joint tenancy
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estate (TR 27, 28) with his wife, Lucy Fagiaino, was appraised at $124,703.31.
After the death of her father, Luke Pagano, appellant's name was placed on all the accounts in issue, except one (TR 44, 45, 46). The accounts were established
as joint accounts in the names of Lucy Pagano and Mary
Walker (TR 44, 45, 46).
Appellant did not make any deposits of her own
funds to said joint accounts, (TR 231) and die did not
make any withdrawals for her own use from any of the
joint accounts during her mother's lifetime. Appellant
testified that she made withdrawals at the request of
her mother, and that all funds so withdrawn were delivered to her mother (TR 41). The amount of money
in dispute in this action is $73,544.00 (TR 2, 26).
Lucy P&gano died at Ogden, Utah, on June 12,1972,
at the age of 81 years (TR 118). She left a last will and
testament which was admitted to probate in Weber
County, and said will provided in part as follows:
"THIRD; After payment of my debts, funeral
expenses, expenses of last illness and expenses of
administration, I GIVE, DEVISE AND BEQUEATH to my husband, LUKE PAGANO, all
of the remainder of my estate, real, personal,
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event of
his prior death or in the event of his death prior
to distribution of my estate, then I give, devise
and bequeath all of my said estate to my four
dhiidren, share and share alike, namely:
Matthew Pagano, my son
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Carman Pagano, my son
Maiy Pagano Adams, my daughter
Miileo Pagano, my son" (PI Ex B).
During her lifetime Lucy Plagiano made gifts of funds
to her children. In .fyprtil, 1967, she made the following
gifts: $5,000.00 to Matthew Pagano, $5,000.00 to Carman
Pagano, $4,000.00 to Mary Walker and $4,000.00 to Miileo
Pagano (TR 85, 86). Thereafter Lucy Pagano made the
following gifts: May 1969—$3,000.00 to Matthew Pagano,
$3,000.00 to Carman Pagano, $1,500.00 to Miileo P&gano
and $1,500.00 to Mary Walker (TR 26); on January 14,
1970, $2,000.00 to Caiman Pagano (TR 87, 93,143) representing a portion of his investment in a farm; in January
1970, $500.00 to Matthew Pagano, $400.00 to Caiman
Pagano, $300.00 to Miileo P&gamo and $300.00 to Mary
Walker (TR 86). Lucy Pagano also made many small
gifts to her <±ildren such as homemade bread, spaghetti,
and other small items, and she was careful, in each case,
to make such gifts veary nearly equal (TR 57).
It was necessary, upon Lucy Pagano's death on June
12, 1972, to name an administrator with will annexed of
her estate, since her husband, Luke Pagano, who was
named executor of her will, had predeceased her. All
four of her children, Matthew, Carman, Miileo and Mary,
met at Millelo's home in Ogden to determine who the
administrator should be. This meeting was held about
two weeks after their mother's death. It was then determined that Carman Pagano and Mary Walker would
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act as joint administrators (TO 75, 262). At this meeting there was conversation about the joint accounts, and
Mary made the following statement: "Mother told me
to keep a little out for my arthritis and divide the nest
up" (TO 155, 121, 122, 123). A few days later Maay
suggested that Lynn Walker, her husband, serve as a
joint administrator in her place, and on June 30, 1972,
all of the parties hereto signed a document nominating
Carman Pagano and Lynn Walker as joint administrators
of the Estate of Lucy P&gano with the wil annexed (PI
ExC).
Appellant had possession of an insurance policy on
Carman Fagamo's life, and her husband, Lynn Walker, delivered it to him near the end of September 1972 (TO
62). Appellant also had possession of an insurance policy
on Milleo Fagano's life, and in September 1972, Milleo's
wife, Margaret,, telephoned Mary in regard to the possession of this policy (TO 15). At this request Mary replied,
"Well, I'm the beneficiary on it, it belongs to me. Furthermore, I'm not going to divide the money" (TO 15).
The following Sunday, Mary and Lynn Walker went to
Milleo's home, delivered the insurance policy, and Mary
told Milleo and Margaret that she was not going to divide
the money (TO 22). She then added, "And don't you
ever tell anyone I've got this money" (TO 15, 16, 17,
128).
During Lucy P&gamo's lifetime there existed a relationship of trust and confidence between her and her
daughter, Mary Walker (TO 28). Lucy Paganiq, while
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an intelligent person, had only a first grade ediication,
and she relied on Mary to assist heir in preparing papans
and accounts (TR 27). Mary had a high school education, a year of business college training, and she had
worked for six years >as a secretary for a finance company
(TR 26, 27).
On cross examination, Appellant testified that Lucy
Pagamo gave her the passbooks on the accounts involved
in this case because she was afraid someone would break
into her (Lucy's) house (TR 70, 230). During her lifetime, Lucy Plagano kept herself informed as to the balance
in her accounts (TR 36).
While Lucy Pagsino was hospitalized in March of
1972, Carman P&gano and appellant had a conversation
at the hospital wherein Mary said, "There is not as much
money in the bank as Milleo thinks there is." She further
stated that her mother said to make sure that Carman
paid off the mortgage on his home (TR 78, 79, 95, 96,
107).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE IS ' C L E A R AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE' TO SUPPORT THE FINDING
OF FACT THAT APPELLANT MADE THE
FOLOWING STATOMENT TO HER BROTHERS: "MOTHER TOLD ME TO PAY HER
BILLS, KEEP A LITTLE OUT FOR MY
ARTHRITIS AND DIVIDE UP THE REST."
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Respondents have no dispute with ihe long standing
rule that the evidence required to establish a constructive
trust must be 'clear and convincing'. However, such rule
does not go so far as to say that the evidence relied upon
to establish the constructive trust must be uncontradicted.
Appellant makes no claim of error on the part of the
court in regard to the standard used by the court in
weighing the evidence or in the court's instmotions to
the advisory jury. The court, after having heard the evidence, clearly stated to counsel that the matter was going
to be decided by the court in accordance with the rules
of equity. The statements made by the court at the
conclusion of the trial, and the findings and judgment
by the court were made in accordance with equitable
rules. The Utah Supreme Court has established the standard for review of equitable decisions governing the determination of a trust as follows:
"The fundamental problem is whether the evidence will support the determination of trust.
Or conversely, to apply the rule of review in
equity cases: does the evidence 'clearly preponderate against the finding of the trial court'
so that we would reverse such finding." Acott
v. Tomlinson, 9 Utah 2d 71, 337 P. 2d 720, at
Page 722.
The finder of the facts considered two separate occasions on which the appellant stated that she held the
funds in issue in accordance with her mother's instructions to divide the money with her brothers. The first
occasion was the meeting of all of the members of the
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immediate family at Milleo's home for the purpose of
naming an administrator with the will annexed. Present
on this occasion were Matthew Pagano, Carman Pagiano,
Milleo and Margaret P&gainQ, appellant Mary Walker and
her husband, Lynn Walker. Each of the respondents testified that on this particular occasion Milleo Pagano
brought up the question of the money in their mother's
savings accounts, and that Mary then made the statement,
"Mother told me to pay her bills, keep a little out for
my arthritis and divkle up the nest." Respondents' evidence on what occurred on this occasion is dear and
definite. Appellant's testimony in response was that
she did not remember being at Milleo's home on such
occasion (TR 51, 52, 53 & 189). However, appellant's
husband, Lynn Walker', clearly recalled the meeting, and
he testified on cross examination as follows:
"As near as I remember the instance, it was at
Milleo's home where we did first get together and
discuss the administrators.
Q. And that is consistent, of course, with the
testimony of Carman and of Matthew and of
Milleo, isn't it, and of Margaret?
A. I believe it is.
Q. And that is not consistent with Mary's testimony, is it?
A. That's correct.
Q. Mary said she had no recollection of such
a meeting?
A. That's correct.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
Q. But was Mary present with you at that
meeting?
A. Well, I am sure she was" (TR 263).
Appellant's contention is that the only thing she said
about the bank accounts was:
"That if they (her brothers) did not cause trouble for her she would consider setting aside some
of the funds left to her in the joint tenancy account and divide them with her brothers as she
saw fit." (Appellant's brief, pages 7-8.)
The second occasion on which appellant declared
she had been instructed to divide the funds in the bank
accounts occurred in July, 1972, when appellant and her
husband, Carman Pagano and Mileo Pagano met at
their mother's home. In regard to this occasion Mileo
testified as follows:
"Q. And at that time did Mary make any statement concerning the money in the bank accounts?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And what were they?
A. She said she would divide the money up if
there wasn't any trouble.
Q. And what did you say about — what was
your comment on that?
A. I told her I don't see how there could be
any trouble.
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Q. Was there any trouble at that time?
A. No, sir.
Q. Were you all getting along reasonably well?
A. Yes, sir" (TR 125).
Appellant's position regarding her statements to her
brothers about dividing the money is contained in her
testimony in response to questions from her own counsel:
"Q. Did you ever state that you would under
any circumstances give part of the money to
them, or did you state, as you have said, I will
see about the money?
A. I will see about the money. I never said I
would give them any amount or anything. I
said I would see about the money" (TR 194).
Capps v. Capps, 110 Utah 468,175 P. 2d 470, is similar
to the case before the court in many respects. The Oapps
case was concerned with the claim of the three children
of a deceased veteran that the mother of the veteran held
the proceeds of his National Service Life Insurance Policy
in trust for his children's benefit in accordance with the
instructions be gave his mother before leaving for the
combat zone where he was killed in action. The evidence
in support of the creation and acknowledgement of the
trust included statements made by the mother of the
veteran, after his death, to the effect that she was collecting the insurance proceeds for the benefit of her deceased
son's children. The Ufeih Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the trial court which imposed a trust upon
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the insurance proceeds and stated at page 475:
"It is true that in nearly ail the cases decided by
this court we have held that in order to establish a trust by parol, the proof must be dear
and convincing; but some of the clear and convincing evidence may be furnished by the defendant, as in this case."
The rule adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in the
case of Vaughcm v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association, 85 Idaho 266, 378 P. 2d 820, is:
"Whether the evidence is dear and convincing
as regards the establishment of the trust was a
question for detennination by the trial court in
the first instance. In re Alberts' Estate, 38 Cal.
App, 42, 100 P. 2d 538, 'Ordinarily, it is a question of fact for the trial court to determine', Fritz
v. Thompson (Cal. App.), 271 P. 2d 205, 210."
In the case of Walker v. Walker, 17 Utah 2d 53, 404
P. 2d 253, the court was presented with a case wherein
plaintiffs brought an action to impose a trust upon realty
which was originally a part of their father's estate. The
trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs and imposed
the trust. There was a dispute in the evidence, and preliminary to its review of the evidence the Utah Supreme
Court stated at page 255 of the opinion:
"Where there is a dispute in the evidence we
view it in a light most favorable to the trial
court's findings."
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Appellant relies heavily upon the case of Jewel v.
Harmer, 12 Utah 2d 328, 366 P. 2d 594, for revereal of the
findings and judgment of the trial court. There are many
substantial differences hetwen the facts in the Jewel case
and the facts in the instant case. In the Jewel case the
eivdence in support of the Plaintiffs consisted of statemeets the deceased was alleged to have made to the
plaintiffs concerning ihe estaiblishmeot of the trust. On
behalf of the defendaost, Ethel Jewel Harmer, there was
substantial evidence of statements by independent witnesses that her father intended to leave the property to
Ethel, subject however to his life estate and a life estate
in favor of his surviving widow, as provided in the deed.
There was undisputed evidence that Ethel personally
paid for the improvem<3nts to the property after the execution of the deed. In the Jewel case there was no evidence of the acknowledgement of the trust by ihe person holding title for the benefit of the beneficiaries, as
there is in the case now before the court. The evidence in
the Jewel case was in great dispute. The plaintiffs' principal independent witaass^ Fred Jensen, on cross examination, admitted that he had made a statement to Ethel
Jewel and her attorney prior to trial, that was in direct
conflict with his testimony on direct examination.
The rule in equity cases as adopted by the Court
in the Jewel case at page 597 is:
"* * * this court, upon review, should not
set aside the finding of the lower court unless
it manifestly appears that the lower court has
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misapplied proven facts or that the finding is
clearly against the weight of the evidence."
POINT IL
APPELLANT'S DECLARATION OF THE INSTRUCTIONS SHE RECEIVED FROM HER
MOTHER CONCERNING THE DIVISION
OF THE FUNDS IN THE ACCOUNTS AND
THEN HER SUBSEQUENT REPUDIATION
OF HER TRUST JUSTIFY THE COURT IN
IMPOSING A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST. .
Appellant claims that even if it is found that she
made such a declaration, that the daim of constructive
trust must Ml as a matter of law. Appellant further
claims that theire is no evidence that Lucy Pagano attempted to set up a txust or that Appellant agneed to a
trust relationship.
The evidence proving the creation of a trust is provided by appellant's own declaration, as found by the
court and advisory jury, "Mother told me to take a little
out for my arthritis and divide the rest" (TR 76, 122,
155). This type of declaration creates a trust in accordance with Restatement of Trusts 2d Sec. 17, which states:
"Section 17. METHODS OF CREATING A
TRUST. A trust may be created by (a) adedaration by the owner of property that he holds
it as trustee for another person; or . .."
This section clearly recognizes the principle that an
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owner of property, by a declaration, can create a trust in
the property as trustee for another person. The legal
effect of appellant's statement to her brothers that she
was holding these accounts under her mother's instructions to divide these funds among her three brothers and
herself is clearly a dtxdaration of the nature referred to
in Sec. 17 of the Restatement of Trusts. Appellant's
declaration was made after her mother's death and at
a time when she held legal title to the funds in the various bank accounts by virtue of her being the surviving
joint tenant.
The fact that appellant is both trustee and a beneficiary does not in any way affect the validity of the trust
or change her obligation as trustee. Section 99 of the
Restatement of Trusts, provides as follows:
"Section 99. BENEFICIARY AS TRUSTEE.
. . . . (2) One of several beneficiaries of a trust
can be the sole trustee of the trust."
Appellant contends that there is no evidence tfaa/t
she agreed to the trust relationship. Her own statement
as well as her conduct dearly establish her acceptance.
The testimony of all of the witnesses is replete with examples of the relationship of trust and confidence that
existed between appellant and her mother (TR 196). It
has been conceded a relationship of trust and confidence
existed between appellant and her mother. In addition
to the declaration made: by appellant, as found by the
court and jury, there is also the evidence of appellant's
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statement to her brother, Milleo, at her mother's home,
"That she would divide the money if there was no trouble" (TR 124). Also in evidence is appellant's statement
to her brother, Carman, while Lucy P&gano was in the
hospital, to the effect that "Mother told me to make sure
you paid off your mortgage" (TR 99). Tins statement
was made at a time when Mary and Carman were discussing the bank accounts. All of these statements made
by a person in a fidcuiary relationship establish the fact
that the trust was accepted by the appellant. The rule
governing the acceptance of a trust is set forth in the Restatement of Trusts 2d Sec. 102:
"Section 102 . . . (2) If a trustee has accepted
the trust, whether the acceptance is indicated by
words or by conduct, he cannot thereafter disclaim . • "
Each of the respondents testified that they relied on
appellant's declaration to the effect that she intended to
divide the accumulated savings accounts of her mother.
Their conduct emphasizes their reliance upon her declaration, The good feeling that existed among the parties
after appellant's statement at Miileo's home is apparent
by the feet that respondents agreed that appellant's husband, Lynn Walker, be nominated to act as one of the
administrators with the will annexed of Lucy Pagano's
estate.
It was not until about three months after Lucy's
death that any of the respondents learned that appellant
had any intention of keeping all of these funds for herself
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and making no division. The first indication to respondents that appellant did not intend to divide the funds
came in a telephone itxwiversation between appellant and
Margaret Plagano, Milleo's wife, in September, 1972, when
appellant said, "And furthermore I have decided not to
divide the money, and I won't have a guilty conscience
about it — it is mine" (TR 15). The preceding statement, made in September 1972, is a statement which is
clearly indicative of a sudden change of mind when compared with appellant's statements made in June and July,
1972, to the effect thai; her mother told her to divide the
money, (TR 194) and that she would divide the money
if there was no trouble, Appellant's reversal of her previously stated position was further emphasized when she
wemft to her brother Milleo's home and delivered his insurance policy to him. At that time she told Milleo and
his wife, Margaret, that she wasn't going to divide the
money (TR 124). Appellant further told Milleo, "Dont
you ever tell anyone I have got this money" (TR 17,
128).
A constructive trust arises where a person holding
legal title to property is subject to an equitable duty to
convey it to another; and the holder of the legal title
would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain
such title. Appellant's declaration concerning the funds
accumulated by her parents clearly establishes that it
was not Lucy Pagano's intention that appellant be the
sole beneficiary of these iiinds. Under such circumstances
appellant would surely be unjustly enriched if she were
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not required to divide the funds with her brothers. Lucy
Pagano's concern and pattern of conduct toward all of
her children during her lifetime and the provision in her
last will and testament for equal division among all her
children show a clear intent to provide for all of her
children. This intent is consistent with the statement
appellant made to her brothers, and it is totally inconsistent with appellant's present position that she has "decided not to divide the money". The cases clearly support
the view that a constructive trust will be imposed by the
court to protect persons who have been wrongfully deprived of their rightful share of property. The case before the court contains a record of overwhelming evidence
of a confidential relationship between appellant and her
mother. This relationship of trust and confidence imposed a duty on appellant not to abuse such trust, nor
to use it to obtain an unfair advantage over her brothers.
POINT HI.
THE COURT ORDERED THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE FUNDS IN THE BANK ACCOUNTS IN QUESTION IN ACCORDANCE
WITH LONG ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES
OF LAW.
The function of the trial court sitting in equity was
to determine what distribution the court should make
when a trustee has failed and refused to carry out the
terms of the trust. This particular question is dealt with
in detail in the case of In Re Dewey's Estate, 45 Utah

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IS
89, 143 P. 124. In this case the issue before dhe court
was what distribution shall the equity court make when
a trustee has refused to follow the directions provided
in the Testator's will. The Testator's will provided as
follows:
"All the rest, r e s i d e and remainder of my property of every kind and nature whatsoever, if any,
which remain after paying discharging all the
debts, bequests, legacies and obligations I bequeath to the said Hubbard Tufctfe, Sr. It is my
desire that he shall distribute the same, or the
proceeds thereof among my nephews and nieces,
and to such of them, and in such proportions,,
as he shall deem just and proper, and his decision upon such matters shall be final, conclusive
and binding upon all panties."
In the above case the Trustee, instead of distributing
the funds among the nieces and nephews as specified by
the will, filed a document with the court whereby he appointed all of the funds to himself. The nieces and
nephew filed objections to the proposed distribution by
the Trustee, and they asked that c a r t e l portions of the
estate be distributed to them.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that the
bequest in which the testatrix expressed her wish or
desire that the trustee distribute the residue or remainder
among her nieces and nephews was not to be regarded
as merely surplusage and without any force whatsoever,
but it would be carried out and enforced by the court.
The court at Page 128 of the Opinion, citing from 2 Beach
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on Trusts, page 142, said:
"But,, where for any reason, the discretionary
power is not exercised, the entire class of the
objects of the trust will be entitled to the property, and they will share and share alike."
The court further considered the nature of the distribution that should be made at page 128 as follows:
"Where the testator has invested the trustee
with discretion to select the beneficiary or beneficiaries from a certain class and to determipe
the amount that should go to each, and in case
the trustee has honestly and in good faith exercised the discretion by making a selection and
by fixing the amounts, the courts will not interfere with what the trustee has done in that regard; but in case he has not complied with the
terms of the trust in making a distribution, or
has entirely failed to make any distribution, the
courts, at the instance of an interested party in
a proper proceeding, will make a distribution in
such manner and upon such terms and conditions
as may be equitable and as will best effectuate
the purpose and intention of the testator." (Emphasis added.)
The court further quoted 1 Beach on Trusts, page
263, and stated:
"But if the donee for any reason fails to act and
the property is not divided, equity will interpose
in favor of the beneficiaries by treating it as a
power in trust and enforcing its execution. In
such cases the distribution by the court will be
to all the individuals of the class designated and
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in equal sums." (Emphasis added.)
The decision of the court was set forth as follows:
"In the case at bar the trustee, under the provisions of the will, could have executed the trust
by making an equal division of the residue of the
estate among all of the nephews and nieces, excluding himself, and therefore a court of equity
may do so."
In the case of In re Boyd's Estate, 87 Sb. 2d 902,
the Supreme Court of Mississippi was presented the
question of interpretation of the word "divide" as used by
a mother in a holographic will. The court, after considering the family background and the context in which the
word "divide" was used, held:
"Circumstanced as she was, how did the testatrix
intend Gladys divide with Richard? The dictionary gives this definition to the word 'divide':
'1. To part asunder (a whole); to sever into two
or more parts or pieces.' To the formal speaker of
the language, 'divide' would no doubt mean to
sever into two or more separate parts. But the
language employed by the testator clearly indicated that she would use words in their colloquial
meaning. The colloquial meaning of 'divide' is:
'To deal out something in portions or equal
shares.' Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition, Unabridged. Here was a
mother speaking to her children through her
will. She was not speaking in the precise language of the lawyer or the formal speaker. It
is our opinion that Mrs. Boyd intended that
Gladys and Richard share equally in one-third
of hear estate.
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Nor do we think that the fact that Mrs. Boyd
provided for equal division of the estate into
three parts for her three children indicated that
she meant something other than equal division
when she said that Gladys should divide with
Richard. The provision for disposition of the insurance money if the property burned does not,
in our opinion, evidence an intention that Richard should not get half of Gladys' one-third of
her estate."
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized the
equity principle of constructive trusts.
In the case of Hawkins v. Perry, 123 Utah 16, 253 P.
2d 372, the fact situation was as follows: Hawkins, a boy
of 16, saved $300.00, and on the advice of Perry, his
uncle, decided to invest his money in a house that could
be rented instead of purchasing a oar. Hawkins delivered
his money to Perry on Perry's promise to buy the home
in Perry's name and then convey it over to Hawkins when
he became of age. Thereafter Perry made a contract to
purchase the home. The project would have apparently
worked as planned, except that Perry added his wife's
name to the contract as a joint purchaser, and later Pferry
and his wife moved to Oregon, and were divorced The
Oregon divorce decree awarded Mrs. Perry all right, title
and interest of Mr. Perry in the property.
Upon Hawkins' claim, the trial court held that there
was a confidential relationship between Hawkins and
Perry, and under the fact situation, it imposed a constructive trust upon the house held by Mrs. Pterry for the
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benefit of Hawkins. The trial court found Mrs. Perry
paid no consideration for the property, was not a bonafide
purchaser, and therefore she took the property subject
to Hawkins' rights as a beneficiary.
In discussing the equity doctrine of a constructive
trust the court said at Page 375:
"Equity imposes a conetructive trust to prevent
one from unjustly profiting through fraud or
the violation of a duty imposed under a fiduciary or confidential relationship. The Utah decision of Chadwick v. Arnold declares '* * *
that a trust ex maleficio (constructive trust)
arises Whenever a person acquires a legal title
to property of another by means of an intentional
false or fraudulent verbal promise to hold the
same for a certain purpose, and, having thus obtained the tiitta, retains and claims the property
as his own.' It is now well recognized that actual fraud is not necessary, but may be presumed
where there is a relationship of confidence between the parties to a transaction and there are
other circumstances tending to show that some
advantage had been taken by the dominant party
with a consequent abuse of confidence. (Emphasis added.)
In Haws v. Jensen, we wrote:
'A constructive trust will be imposed even
though at the time of the transfer the transferee
intended to perform 'the agreement, and even
though he was not guilty of undue influence in
procuring the conveyance. The abuse of the confidential relation consists merely in the failure
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of the transferee to perform his promise"
phasis added.)

(Em-

In the Utah case of Haws v. Jensen, 110 Utah 212,
209 P. 2d 229, at Page 232, the Utah Supreme Court held
that the mother-daughter relationship was evidence of
the conlidenitial relationship of the parties, citing Scott
on Trust, Vol. 1, Sec. 44.2, and stating:
"Constructive trust is imposed even if there is
no fidudary relationship, such as that between
attorney and client^ principal and agent, trustee
and beneficiary, it is sufficient that there is a
family relationship or other personal relationship
of such a character that the transferor is justified in believing that the transferee will act in
his own interest."
Restatement of the Law of Trusts, Sec. 44 comment
(c) accord.
"A court of equity in decreeing a constructive
trust, is bound by no unyielding formula but is
free to effect justice according to the equities
peculiar to each transaction wherever a failure
to perlorm a duty to convey property would result in unjust enrichment. 3 Bogart on Trusts
and Trustees, Part 1, 1946, Ed., Sec. 471."
A case that is remairkiably similar to the case now
before the court is Jarkieh v. BadagHacco, 75 C. A. 2,
505, 170 P. 2d 994, California 1946. In this case plaintiff
and defendant were brother and sister. Anna Jarkieh,
mother of the parties, was an uneducated person unable
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to read and write. During her lifetime the mother was in
a dose relationship with her daughter, and the mother
trusted the daughter, The evidence was conflicting* but
the evidence most favorable to plaintiff supports the implied finding by the jury that at the time the trustee and
two joint tenancy accounts were opened the defendant
orally promised her mother that upon her mother's death
she would divide the money equally with her brother.
The evidence showed that all accounts had their origin
in accounts formerly in the name of Anna JarMeh. The
money represented a lifetime of saving and scrimping by
the mother.
Defendant attacked the judgment, principally in regard to the joint accounts, and relied on Section 15a of
the California Bank Act which provided in pertinent part:
"The making of the deposit in such form (joint
tenancy) shall, in the absence of fraud or undue
influence, be conclusive evidence, in any action
or proceeding to Which either such bank or the
surviving depositor or depositors may be a party,
of the intention of such depositors to vest title
to such deposit and the addition thereto in such
survivor or survivors."
In holding that a trust may be created in joint bank
deposits the court stated at page 99:
"It might also be
15a, in the case of
of fraud or undue
tenant only takes

pointed out that under See.
joint deposits, in the absence
influence, the surviving joint
title to the account. There
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is nothing in the wosrding of that section that
precludes a holding that in a proper case, regardless of fraud or undue influence, the surviving joint tenant holds that legal title in trust for
another. In such a case the conclusive presumption contained in the section is not being disr
turbed. Title goes to the survivor but evidence
is admissible to show that the survivor holds
such title subject to the terms of a trust." (Emphasis added.)
In the case of In re Schulman, 77 N. Y. S. 2, 239
(1947), the court held:
"The testimony adduced on the hearing convincingly establishes that respondent's mother, Ida
Schulman, was solicitous of the well-being of
the respondent and intended to provide for him
by the moneys in the account represented by the
savings bank book herein involved. The account
had been opened in her name. In 1939 she caused
it to be changed by adding the name of her son,
Joseph, decedent herein, as a true joint account,
on his promise that the funds therein would be
used for the benefit of respondent if anything
should happen to her and decedent herein should
survive. The provisions of Section 239, Banking
Law, apply and on Ida Schulman's death, the
account, by reason of the provisions of that section, passed to the joint tenant, decedent herein.
However, the record contains uncontradicted,
clear and convincing testimony of admissions by
decedent, after his mother's death, that he was
holding the account for respondent's benefit pursuant to his mother's direction. A constructive
trust for the benefit of respondent resulted.
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The Oourt finds on all evidence that the moneys
in the account '\tfew held by Joseph Schulman,
decedent herein, after his mother's death for the
benefit of respondent and that such moneys are
the property of respondent. The administratrix
will, therefore, be directed to assign to respondent the money represented by the account in
question and execute and deliver to him whatever papers or doucments may be necessary to
perfect his title thereto.
Proceed accordingly."
The Idaho case of Vaughan v. First Federal Savings
and Loan Association, 85 Idaho 266, 378 P. 2d 820 (1963),
dealt with a question similar to thaJt now before the court.
In this case Lucy Vaughan and John Vaughan divided
their common or community funds on April 22, 1960 and
on May 13, 1960, Lucy commenced an action for divorce
from John. On May 31^, 1960, John Vaughan and his
brother Ted executed a joint savings account agreement
on an account that represented John's share of the funds
remaining from the division with his wife. On June 8,
1960, John Vaughan died, and Lucy Vaughan was ap*
pointed Administratrix; of his estate. Shortly after his
brother's death, Ted Vaughan caused the savings account
to be transferred into his own name. Ted Vaughan is also
guardian of the person and estate of John's minor daughter, Mischaei Diane Vaughan. Lucy Vaughan, as Administratrix, of John Vaughan's Estate, brought an action
against Ted Vaughan alleging the money in the savings
account was an asset of decedent's estate. By his answer
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Ted Vaughan alleged that John Vaughan had added
Ted's name to the savings account
"for the purpose of transferring all right, title
and interest in the same to defendant (Ted) for
the use and benefit, and in trust, for John Theodore Vaughan (Decedent's son) and Mischael
Dianne Vaughan, the son and daughter of the
decedent."
At the trial John Theodore Vaughan, decedent's son,
testified that Lucy Vaughan informed him by letter that
the savings account
"was placed in the joint name of your father and
Ted R. Vaughan for the purpose of creating a
trust."
The trial court held that a trust had been created
under the circumstances and the Idaho Supreme Court
affirmed the decision. The court at page 823 stated:
"In deitmnining the effect of a joint bank account agreement, the detecraninattve consideration is the intent of the depositor, and this is a
question for the trier of the facts."
In the case of Chadwick v. Arnold, 95 P. 527,34 Utah
48, the court recognized the power of the equity court to
declare and administer a constructive trust. The court
at page 532 said:
"Courts of equity in order to administer complete
justice between the parties, will raise a trust by
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consitroation out of the circumsitance^ and this
trust they will fasten on the conscience of the
offending party and wiU convert him into a
trustee of the legal title and oonder him to hold
it for the benefit of the owner."
POINT IV.
APPELLANT WAS GIVEN AMPLE OPPORTUNITY BY THE COURT TO HAVE LYNN
WALKERS TESTIMONY HEARD AND
CONSIDERED BY THE COURT, AND APPELLANT REFUSED TO UTILIZE SUCH
OPPORTUNITY,
Appellant made m offer of proof regairding Lynn
Walker's testimony in chamlbers upon the record. At
that time the court stated:
'THE COURT: Wei, without question, counsel,
the theory that's now presented by the plaintiffs
in this case makes it an equity case. I have the
jury here as an advisory jury, and my handling
of the case at this point is to put to them the
single question of whether or not following her
mother's death Mary Walker made the statement: 'Mother told me to keep a little out for
my arthritis and to divide the rest up.' I am
going to have the benefit of the jury's advice on
that question, rememibeaing that the ultimate dedsijon in the case is for the judge to make. After
the jury has deliberated, Mr. Huggins, I am going to allow you to put that evidence before me.
If I determine later that the objection, on the
basis of the deadman statute, is valid, I can order
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it stricken and not let it be part of my determination9' (TO 269).
The evidence referred to above by the Court is the
evidence in question in Appellant's Point IV*
After the above remarks by the court, the jury was
instructed, counsel made their arguments^ and the jury
retired. Immediately after the jury retired, the following
statement was made in open Court:
MR, KUNZ: "Your honor, it was my understanding at this time that Mr. Huggins was going
to make an offer of proof."
COURT: "He did so in chambers on the record.
Well, I will take any furtheor offers after a brief
recess" (TR272).
Counsel for appellant made no further offer of proof
subsequent to the offer made in chambers on the date of
trial despite the above suggestion made by counsel for
respondents.
After the finding by the jury on May 9, 1974, the
court set the case for further hearing on. May 14, 1974,
and on this date thefellowinginquiry was made by the
court to counsel for appellant:
COURT: "My first inquiry was going to be,
counsel, Whether or not anyone is offering further evidence?"
MR. IRA HUGGINS: "No, we have no further
evidence in view of the court's ruling in the past"
(TR273).
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At this same hearing the court in addressing itself to
counsel for appellant stated as follows:
THE COURT: "* * * The first thing I
want to know is whether or not your side has
any further evidence to offer."
MR. IRA HUGGINS: "If the courtfollowsthe
decision of the jury, yes^ we will have to offer
some evidence" (TR 274).
The court then made thefollowinginquiry to counsel for
respondent:
THE COURT: "Will you be offering further
evidence, Mr. Kumz?"
MR. KUNZ: "I have nothing further to offer at
this time, your Honor. Of course, if counsel offers
evidence, I would certainly like the right to
cross-examine. And depending on that evidence,
I may have to offer some. But at this time I offer
nothing further" (TR 275).
The court's repeated offers to appellant to hear Lynn
Walker's testimony were not accepted, and it is only fair
to conclude that appellant did not wish to avail herself
of the opportunity to have the testimony of this witness
reported in full.
Rule 43 (c) U. R. C. P. provides asfollowsin respect
to excluded evidence:
"(c) RECORD OF EXCLUDED EVIDENCE.
In an action by a jury, if an objection to a ques^
tion propounded to a witness is sustained by the
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court, the examining attorney may make a specific offer of what he expects to prove by the answer of the witness. The court may require the
offer to be made out of the hearing of the jury.
The court may add such other or further states
merit as clearly shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. In actions
tried without a jury the same procedure may be
followed, except that the court upon request
shall take and report the evidence in full, unless
it clearly appears that the evidence is not admissible on any ground or that the witness is privileged:'
It is clear from the record that the court definitely
advised appellant that the ultimate decision in this case
would be made by the court and not the jury (TR 269).
The record demonstrates the court gave appellant an
opportunity to have the testimony of Lynn Walker taken
in full and on the record for the consideration of the
court (TR 272, 273, 274). Counsel ftar respondents made
it dear that he expected such testimony would be offered
to the court and on the record, and that he was prepared
to cross examine this witness (TR 272). Appdlant did
not choose to put sudi testimony on and submit this witness to cross examination on the evidence as set forth
in the offer of proof made in chambers (TR 288,273,274).
It is submitted that by the failure to place such testimony
in the record and to subject the witness to cross examination, that appellant has waived any claim that the court
erred in not considering the tesitimony of Lynn Walker.
The failure of appellant to present such testimony in the
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record before the court was not due to the ruling of
the court, but it was a conscious choice made by appellant.
Therefore, appellant cannot be said to have suffered any
prejudice as a result of any ruling by the court.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court imposing a constructive
trust upon the funds in issue and dividing these funds
equally among the four children of Lucy Pagano is sup*
ported by 'clear and cxwivincing evidence' and is a proper
application of recognized principles of law. It is respectfully submitted that the judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
KUNZ, KUNZ & RENOHER
DAVIDS. KUNZ
# 7 Bank of Utah Plaza
Ogden,Utah 84401
Attorney for Respondents
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